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General Comments April 2018

Comments that are not specific to a certain post should go here, for the month of April 2018. Contributions should relate to the cause and goals of this organization and please, keep it courteous and civil.

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  1. mike r

    You maybe right though 290 with the green badge since most of the lames at registration would probably not even know what it is so they wouldn’t complain. I know it’s our right to wear what we want but you know how they are, they can be real pricks if they want to and make you fight for your life if they decide they want to challenge you on it and refuse to register you. Although you never know unless you do it since some of the agents that I have had have seemed very empathetic to my situation…

    • 290 air

      I think that is one right we may still have (to wear what we want when we register). All these other movements have colors associated with them so why not have our own. We need a movement that shows we are unified. There’s almost a million of us in the US. People need to realize if they can do it to us, what’s to stop them from doing to other groups of people. Just look at the rhetoric coming out from politicians across our country.

      • AJ

        I always wear the same old glasses, the same old t-shirt, and ensure I’m due for a haircut the day or two after “class photo day.” I usually like to have my hair a bit disheveled, too. All just because. I never wear the glasses or shirt anytime or anywhere else. In fact, I keep them in a safe to avoid damage or loss. I figure it’s quite a minor thing, but if it throws one person off from recognizing me, excellent. It’s a minor victory, but I’ll take it. 🙂

  2. mike r

    Seem to have had my other post deleted or something but Yes I totally agree with the green badges and let me re-frame this as it might have been the reason for deletion.. There is also the star that we can wear which many people would know exactly what it means. I think it is one of the best ideas I have read on here in a while…….

    • Tim Moore

      The six pointed star is two triangles intersecting, punishment and regulation. It should be enclosed in a circle to represent the eye on the top of the tower of the panopticon or bondage or even unity, completeness. All are powerful symbols. One can have it embroidered on the upper part of the shirt. The color green may not show up very well except on a white shirt. Maybe white embroidery on a black shirt.

  3. C

    A little one-sided (zero criticism of Russian prostitution), but great observations of our our broken western world.

    The Sexual Revolution Devours Its Own Children In The West – Top Russian Journo Ridicules Hollywood

    https://www.liveleak.com/view?t=XEAr_1522940921&p=1

  4. New Person

    NPS, AlexO, and Mike R,

    Look at what I found online? It’s a 1958 case about 1203.4 and the registry.

    Link: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/160/38.html

    ———————————

    @ Mike R,

    Here’s a quote for you with respect to Involuntary Servitude, Paragraph 14, sentences 3 and 4:
    ===
    But that interpretation, those rulings and those amendments do not affect our problem save to emphasize, by contrast, the fact that the “penalties and disabilities” of the registration and reregistration requirements of section 290 are criminal in character. To illustrate, until the enactment of section 290, a person for the first time violating subdivisions (1) or (2) of section 311, or subdivision (5) of section 647, or subdivision (1) of section 647a of the Penal Code, incurred the penalty of a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or both. Section 290 added a life sentence of compulsory police registration [160 Cal. App. 2d 45] and reregistration. That, clearly, is the imposition of a criminal penalty in the strictest and narrowest sense of that term.
    ===

    From the courts itself stating registration and re-registration are compulsory! But back in 1958, they considered the registry as punishment. Actually, if you utilize Michigan’s Snyder case, they state that in-person registration is a disability.

    But since the AG will state that 2003 Smith v Doe categorized the registry as regulatory, then it cannot be qualified as punishment. That’s great! – with respect to the Involuntary Servitude. Keyword here is the description “compulsory” police registration and re-registration!

    Also, remember how the AG was trying to manipulate that the registry wasn’t “compulsory”? Well, 290 was and has always been defined as “compulsory police registration and re-registration”. But if the AG is calling the registry regulatory, then the registry now violates Involuntary Servitude as it prohibited unless to punish a crime. The registry is triggered by a conviction. The registry was punishment in CA until 2003 Smith v Doe called the registry regulatory. Because the registry is imposed on free citizens, the “compulsory police registration and re-registration” along with all the new regulations, restrictions, and compliance checks, the registry now violates the CA and US Constitution of Involuntary Servitude.

    But if you read before “compulsory police registration”, then you’ll notice the conversation is about 290 registration and re-registration are criminal in character.

    Thus, today’s regulatory scheme is designating free citizens to be characterized as criminals, but are no longer under custody. Those are conflicting ideas. You fail to register and that’s a criminal act – which it is.

    ————————-
    @ NPS and AlexO,

    Here’s a few snippets to smile upon:

    Paragraphs 17 and 18:
    ====
    In short, the fair intendment of these two statutes when read together is that conviction denotes a need for registration and police surveillance when the convicted person is allowed to return to society, whether after serving a sentence or upon the granting of parole or when released upon probation prior to the imposition or the execution of a sentence of imprisonment. But in the case of the probationer who demonstrates his ability to go straight, upon his own, by faithfully fulfilling all of the terms and conditions of his probation, the need for further surveillance and registration terminates upon his release pursuant to the sanction of section 1203.4. fn. *

    [4] A word should be said concerning the state’s contention that section 290 should prevail upon the theory that it is a special and 1203.4 is a general statute. They are not in that [160 Cal. App. 2d 46] category. They do not meet the test for the rule which the state invokes, declared in In re Williamson, 43 Cal. 2d 651, 654 [276 P.2d 593], in these words: ” ‘It is the general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute …’ ” Section 1203.4 deals with all probationers, including those who have committed none of the offenses mentioned in section 290. In addition, section 290 applies to some convicted persons who are ineligible for probation as well as to some who are eligible. Clearly, the rule invoked does not apply.
    ====

    Paragraph 19, sentence 7:
    ====
    Section 1203.4, because it deals with the probationer, has reference to his status as a convicted person during the period of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.
    ====

    This means the conviction only exists during the probation period (if the convicted person successfully completed probation)! It doesn’t exist anywhere else.

    Paragraph 15 and 16 (I added the bracket [1203.4 v 1203.4 registrant] for clarification):
    ====
    Accordingly, we have a seeming conflict between these two statutes. Section 1203.4 releases “thereafter” all penalties and disabilities. Section 290 by imposing the continuing duty to reregister upon effecting a change of address does not expressly recognize any such release. Does section 290, as the later enactment, prevail? We think not.

    A means of reconciling this conflict [1203.4 vs 1203.4 registrant] is furnished by the separate and distinct policies which these two statutes were respectively designed to effectuate. One deals with probation and is designed to foster rehabilitation by giving the probationer an opportunity to erase for the future the legal consequences which normally flow from a conviction. The other requires registration of a person convicted of any of the offenses enumerated, upon the theory it would seem that such offenders are apt to repeat and therefore should be kept under close police surveillance at all times. It is a fair inference that an offender found deserving of probation is not likely to be in need of further police surveillance if he responds to the confidence reposed in him as a probationer and faithfully fulfills the terms and conditions of his probation, designed to impress upon him a keen awareness of his obligations to society and induce him to exert every effort to develop and prove his ability to meet and discharge those obligations and remain at large without further police surveillance.
    ====

    Basically, the courts attacked the registry with respect to re-offending and risk assessment. If you qualify for 1203.4, then you’re already deemed a low risk.

    Now, let’s review PC 290.007:
    “Any person required to register pursuant to any provision of the Act shall register in accordance with the Act, regardless of whether the person’s conviction has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4 , unless the person obtains a certificate of rehabilitation and is entitled to relief from registration pursuant to Section 290.5 .”

    So “disregarding” 1203.4 serves to be retributive than rehabilitative as well as contradicts what this court’s case stated about it (paragraphs 1 and 2):
    ====
    Question: Does the respondent court have jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of petitioner upon a complaint that charges a violation of section 290 of the Penal Code (failure to report a change of address) despite the fact that prior to this alleged failure the conviction (violation of Pen. Code, § 288a) upon which the section 290 charge is based was set aside and petitioner “released from all penalties and disabilities” pursuant to the provisions of section 1203.4 of the Penal Code? fn. *

    In such a state of facts does such a complaint charge the violation of a public offense? Are the registration requirements of section 290 among the “all penalties and disabilities” from which the convicted person is thereafter “released” when, having been granted probation, he fulfills the conditions thereof, as provided in section 1203.4? We think they are, and that the complaint does not charge the violation of a public offense.
    ====

    I don’t see why I simply can’t use this case again, but this time use to show that PC 290.007 violates the US and CA Constitution.

    US 14th Amendment sentence 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. (1203.4 registrants are no different from any 1203.4 recipient.)

    US 14th Amendment sentence 2: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. (PC 290.007 is limiting the immunities of a 1203.4 registrant.)

    *******************

    1203.4 : Remove all penalties and disabilities. (Kelly v. Municipal Court [Civ. No. 18048. First Dist., Div. One. May 2, 1958.] … States a 1203.4 removes a registrant from PC 290. )

    CA Constitution Sec 1, Article 1: Inalienable right to pursue and obtain privacy. (PC 290.007 removed the legal path gain privacy. Pushes it further back to the Certificate of Rehabilitation.)

    CA Constitution Sec 1, Article 7, subsection (b): A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or revoked. (PC 290.007 removes immunities shared by other convicts of 1203.4.)

    CA Constitution Sec 1, Article 9: A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. (PC 290.007 impairs the obligation of contracts provided by 1203.4 as per Kelly v Municipal Court.)

    ++++++++++++++++++
    Sorry about the length, but I just found this case! And this case was already won by a registrant in the state of California stating 1203.4 removes you from the registry! All we have to do now is show that PC 290.007 violates 1203.4 that was already argued and won in the Kelly v Municipal Court case, “removed from all penalties and disabilities”!

    I really don’t know what to say? I’m really giddy right now.

    • Benny

      New person,,, I don’t get much time to come on here and having read your post regarding 1203.4 gave me some hope. My index offence was in 94, which I’ve had it reduced/dismissed as well. 23 yrs later I’m still treated as if I’ve cmmitted this offense yesterday. Sure wish this could all end one day before I’m 6 feet under. Thank u for your diligence, I appreciate your post and hope one day we could make something of this and get us off this wretched registry.

      • New Person

        The newer cases I’ve been reading (Kelly v Municipal, People v Taylor [Crim. No. 6879. Second Dist., Div. Two. Feb. 29, 1960.]), have made a huge distinction between those who qualify for 1203.4 and those who don’t:

        *Those who don’t qualify for 1203.4 have the avenue of Certificate of Rehabilitation.*

        Kelly v Municipal affirmed that 1203.4 relieve the duty to register and re-register as it is considered “criminal or quasi-criminal” and, thus, fits into the “penalties and disabilities”.

        People v Taylor affirmed that 1203.4 permitted those who earned the 1203.4 to be able to have the right to firearms as the negative to the right to firearms fits into “penalties and disabilities”.

        PC 290.007 disregards the distinction between those who qualify for the 1203.4 and those who don’t with one retributive word, “regardless”.

        So yeah… I’m building up more confidence about filing pro se or seeking help doing it. Kelly v Municipal already granted that registrants who earned the 1203.4 are no longer part of PC 290. They already made the arguments that won. PC 290 penalties have increased.

        PC 290.007 negates that immunity that’s already a standard created by Kelly v Municipal. I didn’t have to use an outside case such as Michigan’s People v DiPiazza to show it’s cruel and unusual punishment. So I’m just gonna let this process through my head for a bit and start re-writing my brain storm idea b/c Kelly v Municipal had doors already open that I was trying to open (ideas).

        Oh and thanks for the comment!

    • NPS

      @ New Person

      You can’t use Kelly v. Municipal Court of City and County of SF. It has very negative treatment. In 2014, another registrant had tried to use the very argument you’re pursuing, and the State Supreme Court disagreed because of 290.5. Here is the case. People v. Hamdon (171 Cal.Rptr.3d 95)

      Here are some footnotes of the case:

      “We reject appellant’s contention for two reasons. First, section 290.5 sets forth specific means by which a registrant may be relieved of this requirement and does not refer to a dismissal under section 1203.4a.”

      “As the California Supreme Court has noted, the provisions of section 290.5 and the related provisions governing certificates of rehabilitation and pardons “are consistent with the regulatory purpose to monitor convicted sex offenders, who are generally considered susceptible to recidivism, but to end such special monitoring of those who have demonstrated that their likelihood of reoffense is low.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 265, fn. 4, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811, 92 P.3d 311.) These statutes express a legislative determination that the “likelihood of reoffense is low” for convicted sex offenders only when the statutory provisions are satisfied. Thus, it would be inappropriate to read section 1203.4a as providing an additional, far easier method of obtaining relief from sex offender registration.”

      “We also conclude that, by its own terms, section 1203.4a does not apply to appellant’s registration requirement. This section “ ‘does not purport to render the conviction a legal nullity. Instead, it provides that, except as elsewhere stated, the defendant is “released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense.”

      THE LAST TWO NOTES ARE PRETTY MUCH THE NAIL IN THE COFFIN

      “Our question thus becomes whether the sex offender registration requirement is “imposed … as further punishment for the crime,” or whether it is a “nonpenal restriction[ ] adopted for protection of public safety and welfare.” (Vasquez, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1230, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 25 P.3d 1090.) In Alva, the California Supreme Court unanimously concluded sex offender registration, “[b]eyond doubt,” was not punitive for purposes of the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment: “[T]he purpose and intent of registration are regulatory, as a means of assisting law enforcement in dealing with the serious problem of recidivist sex offenders. Moreover, registration is not punitive in effect notwithstanding the legislative intent. Registration has not historically been viewed as punishment, imposes no direct disability or restraint beyond the inconvenience of compliance, and has a legitimate nonpenal objective. Though registration may have incidental deterrent or retributive effects, and applies to conduct which is already a crime, these features are not sufficient to outweigh the statute’s regulatory nature.”

      “Appellant’s citation to Kelly v. Municipal Court (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 38, 324 P.2d 990 (Kelly ), does not persuade us otherwise. In Kelly, the Court of Appeal held the sex offender registration requirement was “criminal in character” and constituted a penalty or disability released by section 1203.4. (Kelly, at p. 44, 324 P.2d 990.) However, as discussed above, characterizations of the registration requirement as punitive rather than regulatory have been squarely rejected by Alva and Castellanos. Moreover, when Kelly was decided, section 290.5 had not been enacted (see Stats. 1961, ch. 1819, § 1, p. 3866), nor did any other statute expressly set forth a means by which the registration requirement could be released. (Kelly, at p. 41, 324 P.2d [registration is “a burden which the convicted person carries with him until his dying day”].) Kelly thus reasoned: “It is a fair inference that an offender found deserving of probation is not likely to be in need of further police surveillance if he responds to the confidence reposed in him as a probationer and faithfully fulfills the terms and conditions of his probation …,” and therefore, in the case of such a probationer, “the need for further surveillance and registration terminates upon his release pursuant to the sanction of section 1203.4.” (Id. at p. 45, 324 P.2d 990, fn. omitted.) However, the subsequent enactment of section 290.5 evinces a legislative determination that the need for registration continues until the registrant obtains a certificate of rehabilitation or pardon. Kelly is no longer good law.

      • New Person

        NPS,

        Thank you so much for finding this! It’s good research. But I do have to question this case.

        “As the California Supreme Court has noted, the provisions of section 290.5 and the related provisions governing certificates of rehabilitation and pardons “are consistent with the regulatory purpose to monitor convicted sex offenders, who are generally considered susceptible to recidivism, but to end such special monitoring of those who have demonstrated that their likelihood of reoffense is low.”  (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 265, fn. 4.) These statutes express a legislative determination that the “likelihood of reoffense is low” for convicted sex offenders only when the statutory provisions are satisfied.   Thus, it would be inappropriate to read section 1203.4a as providing an additional, far easier method of obtaining relief from sex offender registration.3”

        “However, the subsequent enactment of section 290.5 evinces a legislative determination that the need for registration continues until the registrant obtains a certificate of rehabilitation or pardon.  Kelly is no longer good law.”

        This is called moving the goal post with respect to early termination.

        I. 1203.4 was a legal way to dismiss information or accusation of the crime – the inalienable right to pursue and obtain privacy. In fact, it still is. PC 290 back then was used for police services in 1958. In today’s age, it’s now a part of background checks and can be supplied to the IML. These two factors did not exist for 290 registrants when Kelly v Municipal was passed.

        II. From Kelly decision (1958) to Hamdon (2014), has there been rigorous study between those who were relieved from the registry via 1203.4 and those relieved from a CoR (2005 – PC290.5 enactment)?

        Here’s a citation from Kelly:
        “[4] A word should be said concerning the state’s contention that section 290 should prevail upon the theory that it is a special and 1203.4 is a general statute. They are not in that [160 Cal. App. 2d 46] category. They do not meet the test for the rule which the state invokes, declared in In re Williamson, 43 Cal. 2d 651, 654 [276 P.2d 593], in these words: ” ‘It is the general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute …’ ” Section 1203.4 deals with all probationers, including those who have committed none of the offenses mentioned in section 290. In addition, section 290 applies to some convicted persons who are ineligible for probation as well as to some who are eligible. Clearly, the rule invoked does not apply.

        The parties have given considerable attention to the applicability or inapplicability of our holding in Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736 [254 P.2d 638, 36 A.L.R.2d 1230], interpretive of the word “conviction” as used in section 1 of article II of the Constitution, relating to loss of the elective franchise. We perceive no similarity, no conflict, and no problem. In the Truchon case we pointed out that the word “conviction” has been used in criminal statutes with varying meanings. As used in the constitutional provision there involved we held that “conviction” referred to a judgment which remained final, thereby differing from a mere plea or verdict of guilty. Here we are considering the use of the word “conviction” as it appears in two statutes. Section 290 uses it in both senses: After judgment, in respect to the convict who has served his sentence or who is released upon parole; during the suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (see Pen. Code, § 1203.1), in relation to the probationer. Section 1203.4, because it deals with the probationer, has reference to his status as a convicted person during the period of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.”

        “But in the case of the probationer who demonstrates his ability to go straight, upon his own, by faithfully fulfilling all of the terms and conditions of his probation, the need for further surveillance and registration terminates upon his release pursuant to the sanction of section 1203.4. fn. *”

        Why move the goal post? The courts believed in the assessment of the judges to levy appropriate punishments. Between 1958 until 2000s, 1203.4 was the standard and none thought it harmful to not apply 290 to 1203.4 recipients. That is over 40 years. There is a vast distinction between years of probation and waiting 10 years for a certificate of rehabilitation.

        Here’s the updated CoR directive:
        “The granting of a Certificate of Rehabilitation restores to the applicant some of the rights of citizenship which were forfeited as a result of a conviction. Defendants convicted of a felony, or a misdemeanor sex offense specified in Pen Code SS 290, and who were granted probation, must obtain relief pursuant to Pen Code 1203.4 before a Certificate of Rehabilitation may be granted.”

        I find this above directive very odd. The standard for a CoR for everyone else is dependent on a conviction. I didn’t realize how registrants are treated separately and that there is a much higher threshold to be relieved of the registry. A 1203.4 sets aside a conviction. Why is the relief from the registry a 10-year wait?

        There is a difference between a person who earned a 1203.4 and one who does not. That’s what Kelly v Municipal highlighted. Probation serves as a test and one is only convicted during that probation time, not longer. So I truly don’t comprehend a second test to get off the registry. There isn’t a true scientific reason to push relief to 10 years, especially using Karl Hanson’s research work. If the state can use Karl Hanson’s Static-99, then they can employ his recidivism research work, where there is no lifetime registration because the max is 17 years.

        The sticking point, here, is that if one fails to register, then a penalty will be issued for failing to register. So while the registry is regulatory, a penalty exists for failing to register. Failing to register is a crime. There’s no other way around it.

        In Snyder, in-person reporting is a disability.

        —-
        But the two cases you cited made sure to denote the registry wasn’t punishment.

        “290.5. (a) (1) A person required to register under Section 290 for an offense not listed in paragraph (2), upon obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation under Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 4852.01) of Title 6 of Part 3, shall be relieved of any further duty to register under Section 290 if he or she is not in custody, on parole, or on probation.

        (2) A person required to register under Section 290, upon obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation under Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 4852.01) of Title 6 of Part 3, shall not be relieved of the duty to register under Section 290, or of the duty to register under Section 290 for any offense subject to that section of which he or she is convicted in the future, if his or her conviction is for one of the following offenses:”

        Shall not be relieved of the ‘duty to register’ is direct evidence of compelled service; Compelled service that is not punishment for a crime.

        Either the registry is punishment and Kelly v Municipal stands, or the state is applying compelled service upon a free citizen under penalty of law – a free citizen with a 1203.4!

        CA Constitution, Art 1, Sec 6: Slavery is prohibited. Involuntary servitude is prohibited
        except to punish crime.

        The state can’t have it both ways.

        NPS, thank you for this. Any more info to bounce back upon is helpful so I won’t be blind sided. It gives me ideas I never thought of before or re-iterates what I have thought.

        I gotta do research on when the policy changed that the registry was made available to background checks. If it wasn’t available back in 1958, during the Kelly v Municipal case, then I can use 1203.4 with the California Constitution, Art 1 Sec 1 as attacking PC 290.5 and PC 290.007. I know CA will be supplying the IML, which means the accusation and information was not dismissed. On a background check, 290 is shared. That alone defies what 1203.4 immunity is supposed to supply.

  5. bob

    this is interesting…. looks like a court screwed up for once…

    Bad if the guy really did this stuff…
    but then again 300 years ? really ?… give him 60 he wont get out…

    http://kfor.com/2018/03/01/man-sentenced-to-300-years-in-prison-for-child-sex-crimes-released-on-technicality/

  6. mike r

    I am not even sure what to say about this case. It seems to be an Incredible find New Person…That appears, or at least appears to be, an appeal court even though it states v municipal court…I do not know, AJ may be able to clear that up. I wonder is there any post litigation on this issue or in that case???? It does describe pains and penalties pretty straight forward I just do not know how much water that case holds being so old but it surely brings into question issues about punishment and especially for you New that deals with your 1203 issue….No matter what press forward with learning how to and following thru with a pro se case. No one else is going to do it for you so go after it with all you got man…….For what it is worth, regardless of what you decide to do, any help you need I’m with you all the way, as much as time allows since I am embroiled in my own case and dealing with full time college….Nailing my Political science class. i think the professor is tripping that I know everyone of the SCOTUS justices and have aced every test so far… Love the class….

    • New Person

      @ Mike R,

      NPS found a case that rendered Kelly v Municipal inept because the registry was deemed not punishment.

      It’s a minor road block. PC 290.5 states it’s “a duty to register”. That invokes involuntary servitude b/c it’s only legal compulsory services if it’s punishment. Kelly v Municipal described registering as “compulsory registering and re-registering”. Today’s language used in Megan’s Law and PC 290.5 describes it as “duty to register”. I can establish via Kelly v Municipal that the registry has been identified in the courts as “compulsory police registration and re-registration” and interchangeably “duty to reregister”.

      BTW, you can use that in your argument with the AG to acknowledge the courts have long established registration and reregistration as a compulsory service under Kelly v Municipal.

      I really don’t know what I’m doing. I’m just gathering info little by little. Seeing cases thwart my efforts bring me down, but I’m so determined to still beat it. I got denied a job b/c I’m on the registry recently. I was recommended for a job, but HR denied me. I was depressed for a while. Now… I just want to beat it. Acquiring a 1203.4 and over several years since the the conviction date, yet the public still thinks i’m a liability. It’s a sad reality. You’re never good enough to be normal. The CoR application treats you like a separate convict… except you need to be not a convict to get a CoR. And they can still deny you the CoR! It’s not a direct path off the registry like it was for the 1203.4 under Kelly v Municipal.

  7. mike r

    Check it out concerning the reports and citations out of Millard and the debunking findings.

    Although not binding on this court or specific to this case, Plaintiff finds very persuasive the following list of citations and subsequent findings in those citations in determining the intent of the AG’s in that case.

    • mike r

      “Perhaps most famous is the case of 7-year-old Megan Kanka; her neighbor—who had two previous convictions for sexually assaulting young girls—kidnapped, raped, and strangled her to death. Megan’s parents were unaware that the man living across the street was a convicted pedophile—and they continue to believe that their daughter would still be alive today if they had access to this information. See 34 U.S.C. § 21501; see also Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1116 (2016); Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 315-17 (2001).” Pp 9.
      Most telling is the statement “they continue to ‘believe’ their daughter would still be alive today if they had access to this information.” Plaintiff is very sympathetic to the Kanka’s loss but must nonetheless point out that this is pure speculation, conclusory, and is undoubtedly anecdotal. Whereas the following findings and conclusion in the cited report is based upon documented facts. Once again, the AG’s are attempting to tug on the emotional strings of the court using the same typification, statistical manipulation, and melodrama to justify these laws instead of presenting any facts supporting their assertions of the effectiveness or need for these laws.
      Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric:
      “Clearly, Megan’s Law supporters used rhetoric designed to make opposition to the law politically impossible. They employed a three-part rhetorical strategy that advocates have used previously to push public support for other child protection legislation: typification, statistical manipulation, and melodrama. During the late 1980s, for instance, advocates argued for new stranger child-abduction laws by making these same three claims. First, citing particularly horrible, well-publicized abductions-cases like the Jacob Wetterling incident-they argued that these incidents were typical of the broader abduction problem1 6 Second, they grossly
      exaggerated the extent of the crisis, pointing to the high rate of total child abductions (a number which consisted largely of parental kidnappings) as evidence of a massive stranger abduction crisis.” 7 Finally, they described their political struggle as a melodrama: a battle of good (child protectors) versus evil (child abusers).”‘ As a result of this effective rhetoric, activists successfully convinced the public that stranger child abduction was a scourge sweeping the nation.1 9″ pp 362-363. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1977&context=ilj [visited on April 7,2018].

  8. David Kennerly, The Government-Driven Life

    “Letter: Stop Judge Aaron Persky’s coddling of convicted sex offenders
    His lenient treatment of Brock Turner is really just one example of his favorable treatment of these dangerous offenders.”
    https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/04/08/letter-stop-judge-aaron-perskys-coddling-of-convicted-sex-offenders/

  9. mike r

    Another joke citation….
    “For example, those convicted of molesting boys exhibited a recidivism rate of 35% over 15 years, while convicted rapists exhibited a rate of 24% over the same time period. A.J.R. Harris & R.K. Hanson, Sex Offender Recidivism: A Simple Question, PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA (2004).” pp 6

    A.J.R. Harris & R.K. Hanson, Sex Offender Recidivism: A Simple Question,
    PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA (2004)
    Abstract
    “This study examines sexual recidivism, as expressed by new charges or convictions for sexual offences, using the data from 10 follow-up studies of adult male sexual offenders (combined sample of 4,724). Results indicated that most sexual offenders do not re-offend sexually, that first-time sexual offenders are significantly less likely to sexually re-offend than those with previous sexual convictions, and that offenders over the age of 50 are less likely to re-offend than younger offenders. In addition, it was found that the longer offenders remained offence-free in the community the less likely they are to re-offend sexually. [] These results challenge some commonly held beliefs about sexual recidivism and have implications for policies designed to manage the risk posed by convicted sexual offenders” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/sx-ffndr-rcdvsm/index-en.aspx#a01 [visited on April 7, 2018].

  10. mike r

    Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric:
    “Clearly, Megan’s Law supporters used rhetoric designed to make opposition to the law politically impossible. They employed a three-part rhetorical strategy that advocates have used previously to push public support for other child protection legislation: typification, statistical manipulation, and melodrama. During the late 1980s, for instance, advocates argued for new stranger child-abduction laws by making these same three claims. First, citing particularly horrible, well-publicized abductions-cases like the Jacob Wetterling incident-they argued that these incidents were typical of the broader abduction problem1 6 Second, they grossly
    exaggerated the extent of the crisis, pointing to the high rate of total child abductions (a number which consisted largely of parental kidnappings) as evidence of a massive stranger abduction crisis.” 7 Finally, they described their political struggle as a melodrama: a battle of good (child protectors) versus evil (child abusers).”‘ As a result of this effective rhetoric, activists successfully convinced the public that stranger child abduction was a scourge sweeping the nation.1 9″ pp 362-363. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1977&context=ilj [visited on April 7,2018].

  11. mike r

    Most telling is the statement “they continue to ‘believe’ their daughter would still be alive today if they had access to this information.” Plaintiff is very sympathetic to the Kanka’s loss but must nonetheless point out that this is pure speculation, conclusory, and is undoubtedly anecdotal.

    • mike r

      Whereas the following findings and conclusion in the cited report is based upon documented facts. Once again, the AG’s are attempting to tug on the emotional strings of the court using the same typification, statistical manipulation, and melodrama to justify these laws instead of presenting any facts supporting their assertions of the effectiveness or need for these laws.

  12. mike r

    So, I have two major questions as soon as I am front of type judge again during the Status Conference: 1) “your honor, do I have a fundamental liberty interest in familial relationships when it comes to the relationship with my own grandchild?; 2) “do I have a fundamental procedural due process right to enter into evidence my supporting documentations I have before this court in the interest of justice and to assist in the speedy expedition of this case and to retain such information for this court’s review as well as for subsequent review?” If the court states no in either case I wish to object on the grounds that I am suffering a procedural due process violation for failure to recognize my material facts that would help expedite the disposition of this case and in the interest of a fair and just judicial process. As far as the familial relationship issue I will let the court of appeals decide that issue but I object to the court assertion that I do not have a fundamental liberty interest in familial relationships with my own grandchild that is being violated by Family Code section 3030 et seq..

    • Chris F

      I sent you a private email, but this may be relevant to others in California especially, so I’ll share it here:

      If you are wanting to make an argument for your rights as a gandparent, you’ll want to read all of this, especially parts that mention California:

      https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5348&context=uclrev

      Pay particular attention to page 12 where it talks about Miller v California and make sure to read the pages after that. You’ll need to read the entire thing for lots of tidbits of how to argue it.

      Basically, you don’t have protected rights as a grandparent acting alone or against the wishes of the parents, but there may be a protected liberty interest when the parents want you involved and anyone acts to de-rail that. In effect, California doing anything to affect your grandchildren’s parents wanting to involve you in a close family relationship violates your rights to be part of that when you want to be.

      • mike r

        As usual great minds think a like my friend…This is exactly what I am saying and I will check at that case if I didn’t already but man can you believe the AG’s citations???? I am just literally almost (contradiction lol) on the floor LMFAO it is so insane…..

  13. T

    I have a question, is it possible to make a discussion about the military UCMJ and how that system collaborates with the registry?

    • TS

      @T

      State and Fed law states if you are convicted under UCMJ in a military court, you are to register per State law.

  14. David Kennerly, The Government-Driven Life

    “Convicted sex offender arrested for rape weeks after removal from Megan’s Law website.” Pennsylvania, that is. Well, this was an inevitability. https://www.wpxi.com/news/top-stories/convicted-sex-offender-arrested-for-rape-weeks-after-removal-from-megans-law-website/729786561

    • ReadyToFight

      Welp… I hope they throw the effing book at that person!
      Anyone that gets a second chance at living a normal life and then pisses it away by committing such an act deserves nothing.

      • Facts should matter

        And sadly this will only reinforce their argument that Megan’s Law is a deterrent.

        • ReadyToFight

          I think what it really highlights is the fact that there’s no thought involved by punishing ppl per penal code.
          Where’s the risk assessment?
          And the bigger factor Mental Health. Nothing says
          “broken system” better than sweeping things under the rug and replacing rehabilitation with punishment incarnate. The Registry distorts whatever semblance we have of being good citizens and sadly some SO’s will start to view themselves as the demons society pants them to be. At that point there’s nothing left to lose.

        • CR

          ML registries ARE a deterrent!!! They are intended as such by the legislatures. Deterrence is one of the traditional aims of punishment. This helps to establish in court cases, as was done in Snyder v Does and in Muniz v PA Commonwealth, for example, that registries are punitive and therefore violate ex post facto laws when applied retrospectively. Specifically, it satisfies the 4th Mendoza-Martinez factor.

        • New Person

          Or this person could be one of the 5% re-arrested, 3.5% re-convicted stat. This isn’t in conflict with the recidivism rates. So why punish the 95 – 96.5% of registrant population?

          We deal in facts, not headlines. I would emphasis and re-emphasis this.

  15. David Kennerly, The Government-Driven Life

    “Sex offenders register for a lifetime, but a bill would let some petition for removal” (Missouri)

    Also in this bill: “The bill also distinguishes different kinds of sexual offenses, and imposes a lifetime sentence with no eligibility for parole for those who commit a predatory sexual offense.

    A predatory sexual offense, as defined in the bill documents, is the offense of statutory rape, statutory sodomy, rape, sodomy, child molestation and sexual abuse all of the first degree, plus child molestation of the second degree. The penalty would be life without parole, which is a possibility for predatory offenders but not mandatory as it would be under this new legislation.”

    https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/state_news/sex-offenders-register-for-a-lifetime-but-a-bill-would/article_4854f698-3c1c-11e8-bbd2-4f7aa65e3c0c.html

    • CR

      There may be some specific cases where life without parole for one of these offenses is an appropriate sentence, but that is something the courts should decide; not legislators. Civil commitment is already effectively the same thing for some offenders. Generally, I think mandatory sentencing of any kind is unjustified and unnecessary, and that such laws are passed primarily for political reasons.

      I hope the state’s accounting office analyzes the cost of this proposed legislation. Given the number of such offenses that occur each year, the state’s cost for incarcerating all offenders for life is going to quickly become unmanageable.

  16. Lake County

    I’m not sure if this could apply to the Smith v. Doe case with the “recidivism of sex offenders being frighting and high”, but here is a case where SCOTUS said that using expert opinions based on experience was not as valid as using scientific knowledge or evidence.

    I found this info being mentioned due to the many autograph experts that base their opinions on experience and not on scientific evidence by trained forensic examiners that use scientific equipment. Most autograph experts in the sports industry use experts with no scientific experience, only their personal experience in recognizing so called authentic autographs.

    https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/97-1709.ZS.html

    KUMHO TIRE CO. V. CARMICHAEL

    Kumho Tire moved to exclude Carlson’s testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which says: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact … , a witness qualified as an expert … may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.” Granting the motion (and entering summary judgment for the defendants), the District Court acknowledged that it should act as a reliability “gatekeeper” under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, in which this Court held that Rule 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that scientific testimony is not only relevant, but reliable. The court noted that Daubert discussed four factors–testing, peer review, error rates, and “acceptability” in the relevant scientific community–which might prove helpful in determining the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique, id., at 593—594, and found that those factors argued against the reliability of Carlson’s methodology. In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the District Court had erred as a matter of law in applying Daubert. Believing that Daubert was limited to the scientific context, the court held that the Daubert factors did not apply to Carlson’s testimony, which it characterized as skill- or experience-based.

    This might not help us with SCOTUS since they accepted the “Frightening and High” testimony, but then again, it cant hurt to bring up the standard they set in this case in regard to expert testimony.

  17. mike r

    Good contribution Lake, it is nice to see you get in the fight. I know you have legal talent as you have stated and you are smart so any insight and citations like that help…..You never know what we might be able to use and believe me I document everything. Look at the following which blows their “sex offenders sexually re-offend four times higher than other criminals.”

    California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 2010 Adult Institutions Outcome Evaluation Report “Figure and Table 11 show that for all releases, the three-year recidivism rate for flagged sex offenders is 3.1 percentage points lower than nonflagged offenders. First-release flagged sex offenders have a lower recidivism rate than nonflagged offenders (5.0 percentage points) while re-release flagged sex offenders also have a lower recidivism rate than those offenders who were re-released without a sex registration flag (2.1 percentage points).” [Ibid].
    Therefore, refuting the comparative rate assertions that released sex offenders sexually recidivate at four times higher the rate as non-sex offenders. https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/ARB_FY0506_Outcome_Evaluation_Report.pdf [visited April 4, 2018]. Complaint pp 43 ¶ 176.

  18. Grace

    I just read that after state registration in Maine the feds sent a form to the registrant regarding SORNA travel. It said any travel plan out of state for any reason must be sent to the board. Has anyone heard of this?

    • TS

      @Grace

      Feds don’t care about your out-of-state travel, just your out-of-country travel. If the Feds send you any form about travel that would be a first reported.

      • Grace

        I have the form. I need Janice to get in touch to tell me where we can upload it.

      • Renny

        The Feds might have slipped some Commerce Clause rule in past legislation that has caused the 21 day out of state travel notification requirement to be popping up around the country.

        • @Renny

          Still not seeing anything online for this regarding Maine, 21 day advance domestic SO travel notification, etc

  19. mike r

    Okay so check it out. I believe this is a game changer (hate the statement but is apropos here).
    Judicial Notice:
    Under Federal Rules of Evidence > Article II. Judicial Notice > Rule 201 (b) (2), (d) . Plaintiff respectfully request the court take judicial notice of the following:
    Plaintiff is including citations and findings and recommendations from multiple state administrative agencies such as California Sex Offender Management Board (CASOMB) as well as multiple Department of Corrections and other administrative bodies statutorily tasked with scientifically conducting, evaluating, and reporting statistical analysis of recidivism and the efficacy of the sex offender registration statutes (these citations are all from governmental administrative agencies’ websites (just as the court’s recognition of the Megan’s Law Website for judicial review purposes) and are “public record from an administrative body of the type subject to judicial notice” and can be reasonably relied upon by the court. Id. Rule (b)(2)). See Magistrates Findings and Recommendations pp 5 at 5-7. Also see, “Courts may take judicial notice of some public records, including the records and reports of administrative bodies.” U.S. v. Richie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
    Plaintiff is also including Attorneys General’s (AG) and a Solicitor General’s citations from Colorado’s Millard v. Rankin. Which Plaintiff can reasonably infer that these are reasonably reliable reports that the court can take judicial notice of. Id. Rule (b)(2). Also, Plaintiff includes for judicial review Dr. Karl Hanson’s Declaration from California’s Doe v. Harris 772 F.3d 563, 572 (9th Cir. 2014). Id. Rule (b)(1) and (b)(2).
    These reports and findings are crucial to the questions of law in many of Plaintiff’s claims in his Complaint. The justification and the efficacy issues are integral to Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims rely heavily on such facts as presented. Plaintiff’s punitive intent and effects rely heavily on such facts. All these facts are evidence for this and subsequent court review. If the court refuses to take judicial notice of any of the following adjudicative facts Plaintiff request hearing pursuant to Id. Rule 201 (e).

    This is big I think and I cannot believe no attorney has done this. This puts an end to the discussion of erroneous misinformation about sex offender recidivism rates as well as the efficacy issues once and for all…..

  20. mike r

    Here is the draft…Incredible if I don’t say so myself..LOLLLLLL

    https://ufile.io/qhf3l

  21. David Kennerly, The Government-Driven Life

    “Fake recidivism numbers!”

    From Bill Dobbs:

    Fake recidivism numbers: Illinois has a law banishing individuals on the sex offense registry from public parks. In 2017 an Illinois appeals court struck down the statute, saying “it bears no reasonable relationship to protecting the public.” Now comes the Illinois Supreme Court with a unanimous ruling *upholding* the park ban. Fake recidivism numbers don’t seem to bother the court much as fear and spinelessness triumph over reason! Kudos to Marc Pepitone and his legal eagle Katherine Strohl for waging this fight. Stay tuned, one of the claims has been sent to a lower court and the litigation is expected to continue. There’s a link below to the decision. Jacob Sullum has an excellent report and analysis for Reason.com, have a look! -Bill Dobbs, The Dobbs Wire info@thedobbswire.com

    Reason | Apr. 11, 1018

    Writing Sex Offender Laws Based on Fake Recidivism Numbers Is Rational, Court Says

    The Illinois Supreme Court unanimously upholds a law banning sex offenders from public parks.

    By Jacob Sullum

    Last week the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a state law banning sex offenders from public parks, overturning a 2017 appeals court ruling that deemed the statute “unconstitutional on its face because it bears no reasonable relationship to protecting the public.”

    In reaching that conclusion, the justices relied on alarming claims about recidivism among sex offenders, even while acknowledging that the claims have been discredited. The decision, written by Justice Mary Jane Theis, shows how fear overrides logic in dealing with sex offenders and how toothless “rational basis” review can be, allowing legislators not only to draw their own judgments but to invent their own facts.

    In this case, both the legislature and the judiciary have assumed crucial facts that simply are not true, as far as we can tell based on all of the research that has been done during the last few decades. Theis is saying laws should nevertheless be written and upheld based on those demonstrably false assumptions until legislators decide to gather data. MORE:

    https://reason.com/blog/2018/04/11/court-says-relying-on-fake-recidivism-nu

    People v. Pepitone

    Illiniois Supreme Court

    Opinion and decision April 5, 2018

    http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2018/122034.pdf

  22. Facts should matter

    MLK was actually incorrect when he stated that: “Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that.”

    Yeah, that strategy would never, ever work in our favor. We’ve been forced to relinquish our privacy, safety and security under threat of incarceration. How can we love our elected officials that use weaponized hatred against us?

    I actually have pity, NOT love, for LEOs, lawmakers and judges because they’re not fighting the good fight they think they are fighting us every step of the way upholding Megan’s law.

  23. B.Wat

    I’m thinking of moving to Brentwood, in Contra Costa co. Does anyone know anything about how It is to live there? What I mean is how does LE treat people there ( compliance checks, notifie neighbors when you move in, etc) or any over zealous citizens with pitch forks? We live in the South Bay now and commute up there several times a week to visit our grand kids and the drive is getting kind of old! We just want to be in their lives and don’t want any more of the bull shit that comes with being on the 290 greatest hit list, it’s been 30 years now.

  24. Ptd

    I applied for a passport and jut received it today. Surprisingly, there is NO IML STATEMENT IN IT!!!! Thanks Janice for the lawsuit! My current job will soon be requiring me to travel and I didn’t want that hassle along with the possibility of losing my job, (I’m making $80k a year).

    • CR

      Ptd, in order to get the IML-mandated scarlet letter badge-of-shame “endorsement”, which says “The bearer was convicted of a sex offense against a minor and is a covered sex offender pursuant to 22 United States Code Section 212b(c)(l)”, you would need to meet two criteria: be required to register in any jurisdiction, and have been convicted of a sex offense against a minor.

      Could you clarify whether or not you met both of those criteria? If you met one, but not the other, then you would not get the endorsement. For example, if you were convicted of a sex offense against a minor, but you were no longer required to register, then you shouldn’t get the endorsement.

      If you did meet both of those criteria, then you might consider the possibility that the State Department’s failure to add it was an error that they may catch and correct at some future time.

      • Ptd

        CR,
        That’s probably the case as I meet both those criteria. I will be petitioning to no longer have to register in August. In doing my background checks for my current position, the county, state and feds came up clear. The Fed registry entry came up as “consider”. Whatever that means.
        Hopefully they won’t catch it as I may have to travel out of country for my work.

        • @Ptd

          Then for your safety, it’s hoped that you do not have to travel between now and the time you’re successful petition to no longer register comes through. That is said with the best of intentions because if you give a 21-day notice, as you still should, who knows what the outcome could be for you wherever your passport or travel notification is acted upon.

      • CR

        Thank you for the info, Ptd. It helps us all gain a better understanding of how the IML is being applied, who is affected, and under what circumstances.

        That’s interesting about the background check. I’ve never heard of the “consider” result or status.

        I hope your petition next August to get off the registry is successful.

    • Need to Know

      Great news Ptd. We are all trying to piece the puzzle together and this helps. Some are suggesting that its the notification that triggers the passport branding, but does it trigger for all? Could it be by which level you are? Maybe by state and whether they send notification? So much unknown… Hopefully Janice’s lawsuit will help us figure this out, though sounds like we won’t know anything until at least June.

  25. Chris F

    It has to be time to quit playing whack-a-mole soon with all of these laws against sex offenders. As shown in IL, even things that should be a slam dunk are lost.

    As long as these ridiculous laws against sex offenders are deemed OK by courts, then perhaps attacking inclusion on a registry as a Substantive Due Process violation is becoming the way to go. After all, the courts are making decisions that legislature is allowed to pass any law they want to against “sex offenders” and calling it rational because the class know as “sex offenders” are rationally expected to be dangerous and recidivate. So isn’t the way to attack that to say that the average “sex offender” did not get adequate “substantive due process” to be labelled as someone that recieves that long list of restrictions and violations of liberty?

    I think as long as courts think any law saving children is ok to any extent, then we must challenge inclusion on that list and not the consequences of being on it. In that case, add more crazy stuff to the restrictions and make the case easier that most registrants shouldn’t be on it.

  26. mike r

    I am actually looking for the original briefs that were filed in the district courts in both Millard and Snyder. Any help people???????????

  27. TS

    Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism

    Am J Public Health. 2010 March; 100(3): 412–419.

    https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2820068/

    Plethora of sources (78 specifically) quoted and referenced from this March 2010 study to use in battling Megan’s Law, registry, etc. I have not seen this mentioned here previously, but not saying it has not where it was missed.

    Some good paragraphs to debate the unreported stats in addition to recedivism scare tactics, etc.

  28. TS

    Latest SMART office SORNA progress check of all 50 states as of Apr 5, 2018: https://www.smart.gov/pdfs/SORNA-progress-check.pdf & https://smart.gov/sorna-map.htm

  29. mike r

    What do you think?? I am filing this tomorrow or the next day before the judge has a chance to rule on my screwed up request for judicial notice that I filed in my objections. I include ONLY gov docs so I think this is solid. If you have any GOV docs that I haven’t included throw them back at me….Although I hate the saying:I think this could be a game changer.
    https://ufile.io/piuig
    I do not know why no one has done this already, if I am correct it seals the deal man………..

  30. mike r

    Oh yeah people, I have my first win.

    They admit to subject matter jurisdiction…

    Defendant concedes the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff’s challenges to California statutes: (1) SORA (Penal Code § 290, et seq.); (2) Megan’s Law Internet Website (Penal Code § 290.46).

    “Neither the motion to dismiss or the Magistrate Judge’s ruling applies to the Court’s
    jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff’s challenges to California statutes: the Sex Offender Registration
    Act (SORA) or Megan’s Law.” (See page 1 at 18-20 Defendants Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to MFR).

    • AO (AlexO)

      @Mike. R, Congratulations! I’m glad that they’ll at least consider it to the end instead of just dismissing it. Keep going! Make the DA hate all the “loopholes” you’re using! lol

  31. mike r

    Well, here is what I am going to file right now. Lets see what they think about this…
    https://ufile.io/hlboe
    I guess it does not really matter now since it is going to be filed but I would still like to know what you people think….

    • David

      @ mike r: I tried downloading so I coud read it, but it was 220 blank legal pages (though your name and “pro se” appear at the bottom of some pages). *shrug*

      • mike r

        Well I do not know what’s up, I double checked it when I loaded it and just downloaded it again and it was fine. Anyways here is the link to my site where it is uploaded along with every filing in my case.
        http://mllkeys20112011.wixsite.com/mysite
        Check it out let me know if you have a problem. Wow 22 filings already…

  32. mike r

    Filed, and thanks I will use every loophole, rule, or benefit of being Pro Se in every-way possible. I think they are going to like what I just filed………….And yes Subject Matter Jurisdiction is the first score on the board. Let’s hope the score stays in my favor….Feels good to score the first points though….

  33. mike r

    I think in whatever I file next I am going to point out how embarrassing and ridiculous this entire situation actually is considering all the relevant facts. It is absolutely absurd for the courts to support such legislation considering all the relevant evidence. The courts should however be “VERY” upset that the solicitor general and all the proponents of these laws have manipulated and misinformed the court, and the public, about the actual danger posed by registered sex offenders and has managed to infect an entire field of law for decades based on those false declarations that the proponents knew all along were false as far back as 1994 according to the AG’s own citation. Legislation must not be a perfect fit but it cannot be based on fabricated and falsified information and it must be rational which the current system is far from.

  34. David Kennerly, The Government-Driven Life

    RMJ, Thank you but you really only need to look at this one: https://ufile.io/n9ykm Please take a moment to do so.

    It addresses several of your points. For one thing, the letter “R” CAN be worn by anyone who is opposed to the Registry, not just Registrants (Registry, Resist, Reform, Repeal, etc.). This badge clearly can be worn by anyone who finds the Registry repulsive, not just Registrants. PLUS, the American flag IS in this version albeit in an allusory and more abstract form but it is clearly there. I think many have grown inured, by now, to the trite red circle with the diagonal bar symbol. I wanted something that conveyed the horror of the Registry, which I feel this design achieves. Thanks for taking note of this project!

  35. AJ

    Wow, for once Reichsfuhrer Sessions has done something beneficial, though accidentally and only out of spite towards Sanctuary Cities: https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/04/17/sessions-punishes-everyone

    From reading this, I can only surmise the money for “compliance checks” is (at least temporarily) dried up. Pardon me while I go wipe that tear from my eye…

  36. AJ

    Reading Gorsuch’s concurring Opinion from Sessions v. Dimaya (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/15-1498_1b8e.pdf or for truncated reading: https://reason.com/volokh/2018/04/17/crossover-sensation-neil-gorsuch), I found some of his references heartening. Perhaps I was reading things into them, but his listing of a number of ‘”civil” penalties’ (quotes in original) makes me think he doesn’t like them. (Why else would he list them in an Opinion?)
    *****
    Today’s “civil” penalties include confiscatory rather than compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be taken, remedies that strip persons of their professional licenses and livelihoods, and the power to commit persons against their will indefinitely. Some of these penalties are routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those associated with misdemeanor crimes— and often harsher than the punishment for felonies.
    *****
    Hear hear, Justice Gorsuch! Too many of us, not just RCs, are living proof of penalties “harsher than the punishment for felonies.”
    =====
    I also liked his discussion of Due Process. What I gleaned is that he’s a proponent of stronger DP rights for the citizen, regardless of whether a law is civil or criminal. As I say, I may be reading things into his words, but I hope not! Though the case was a vagueness challenge, and seemingly an easy one (though 5-4 indicates otherwise), to me it shows he’s wary of government and Congress willy-nilly tossing out laws for judges (and perhaps the US AG regarding IML?? 🙂 ) to figure out. Let’s hope so.
    =====
    Finally, I have to say I find his writing style quite dry and awkward. I’m certainly not the first to say he’s no Scalia when it comes to prose. But he can write in Greek with a yellow crayon for all I care, as long as he’s being a non-partisan Justice.

    • Lake County

      I’ve listened to Justice Gorsuch every chance I get. I have always liked the statements he’s made and his way of thinking about the rights of the individual. Although anyone that Trump picks for any job always seems scary to me, I believe this SCOTUS pick was as good as anyone could have picked. I believe he will most often rule based on the constitution and not public opinion or emotions. But of course, time will tell.

  37. mike r

    Look at this people, residency restrictions in all but name. I have been telling people that this was going to happen for a while now. Without a ruling from the court stating that residency restrictions are unconstitutional for NON-Parolees then these scu&^$%bags are going to exploit the opportunity to boost their agendas and votes. They are doing it by proxy and not using law enforcement as a way to circumvent any challenges to such a law. And it WILL work since it will be landlords and potential sellers that make the cal and not police….WOW and this is the first I have heard of this proposed legislation in CA. AJ look how this will be preventing subject matter jurisdiction maybe since it will not be any of the AG’s minions enforcing this…..

    “Our first opportunity is in Sacramento on April 24 when the Senate Public Safety Committee will consider Senate Bill 1143. If passed, that bill would require registrants convicted of an offense involving a minor to disclose their status as a registrant to potential landlords as well as to home sellers if the property is within one-quarter mile of a school or a park. The penalty for not making such a disclosure is that the landlord could break a lease or the home seller could break a home sales contract.”

  38. mike r

    I am getting pretty adept at this legal jargon and I cannot see any way of challenging this since they are bypassing subject matter jurisdiction so unless the courts are willing to consider these factors under the Mendoza-Martinez factors we are burnt………

  39. mike r

    Yeah that is a great statement by Gorsuch. Very encouraging really, now only if the rest of the justices follow that logic.

  40. New Person

    Mike R or anyone else who can help (Chris F, AJ, NPS, AlexO, etc…),

    I’m going to try to take PC 290.007 down this summer, hopefully.

    PC 290.007
    Date enacted: 2007
    ====
    Any person required to register pursuant to any provision of the Act shall register in accordance with the Act, regardless of whether the person’s conviction has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4 , unless the person obtains a certificate of rehabilitation and is entitled to relief from registration pursuant to Section 290.5
    ====

    I think I can file under “writ of prohibition”, but going this route only attacks the lower court decision. I don’t exactly know what to file.

    Here’s what I have so far to refute PC 290.007, negating recipients of 1203.4 who are registrants:

    1. Kelly v Municipal Court
    Link: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/160/38.html
    Date enacted: 1958
    …. Court says that PC 290 doesn’t apply to registrants who qualify and successfully completed their probation to earn 1203.4.

    2. Abbott v City of Los Angeles
    Link: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/53/674.html
    Petition: Action for Declaratory Relief, and injunction
    …. Court states ordinance for registration is unconstitutional with respect to 1203.4 as it conflicts with decision by Kelly v Municipal AND lack of knowledge (non PC 290 registration).

    3. Lambert v Municipal Court
    Link: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/lambert-v-municipal-court-26996
    Petition: Writ of Prohibition
    …. Court re-affirms an ordinance for registration is unconstitutional via Abbott v City of Los Angeles.

    Huh… I guess the petition should be Declarative Relief? I could use feed back on the brainstorming process. PC 290.007 conflicts with Kelly v Municipal. I’ll provide US and California Constitutions were violated, but if you read “Abbott v City of Los Angeles”, then you’ll discover the Court doesn’t venture into other violated constitutions. The Court stopped once they agreed that the ordinance was in conflict with “Kelly v Municipal”.

    Thanks for any feed back.

    • mike r

      IDK New Person you may want to see if you can find more recent cases as those are all very old….

  41. mike r

    absolutely insane and I hope Janice or some attorney jumps on this using Re Taylor. Watch and mark my words next is presence prohibitions as soon as they figure out a way to survive and around the courts.

    See In re Taylor, (Cal. 2015) where the California Supreme Court struck down California voter approved sex offender residency restrictions as applied to parolees situated in San Diego county. The Court record is replete of evidence documenting and articulating the vast extent of banishment those individuals were facing. The Court determined that the statute left over 90% of San Diego county housing opportunities off-limits, completely undermining the rehabilitation process and lacking any rational relationship to public safety. Since the Court only addressed that narrow issue concerning parolees, the Court did not directly address whether residency laws apply to non-parolees, but more importantly for this case, is the In Re Taylor decision does not prevent the local municipalities from enacting their own restrictions which have made literally thousands of communities off limits to Plaintiff. That is the classic definition of Banishment. Just because the public are not burning Plaintiff’s residence down (yet) and dragging him tarred and feathered to the city borders and ordering him never return does not mean that Plaintiff does not suffer banishment.
    As well, the Court in In Re Taylor did not address presence restrictions and safety zones which further pushes Plaintiff to the fringes of society and in many instances causes total Banishment from places such as parks, libraries, beaches, movie theatres, places of worship, and many other public and non-public locations where “children may congregate.”

  42. David

    Here’s an interesting podcast: CATO Daily Podcast. Look for the recent episode entitled “Void for Vagueness”. Definitely worth listening to. I think you’ll hear a lot of good arguments that could be applied to the Registries. (At least, I noted numerous similarities ….. so there is hope!)

  43. David Kennerly, The Government-Driven Life

    “Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office using “eyes” to track sex offenders, criminals”

    I had to read this one twice to make sure that it was not a parody.

    “The biometric iris system takes a photo of the individual’s eye, then stores their information a national registry. This allows agencies around the country to pinpoint a true person’s identity in just seconds.”

    http://abc3340.com/news/local/jefferson-county-sheriffs-office-using-eyes-to-track-sex-offenders-criminals

  44. New Person

    Doing light research work still about 1203.4 and “Kelly v Municipal”, I stumbled upon this Santa Clara Review of cases in 1984, Link: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=lawreview

    It’s reviewed re: Reed case, 290 is cruel and unusual punishment for a misdemeanant sex offender. Also, it found the registry to be punitive via the seven M-M factors. Here’s the conclusion to that review:
    ====
    CONCLUSION
    Reed has firmly established the Mendoza-Martinez factors in
    California law as the composite test for determining what is punishment
    and the Lynch technique for inquiring whether a disproportionality
    exists between a crime and its punishment.
    Reed, through application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors,
    held that section 290 registration of section 647(a) offenders is punishment
    in the constitutional sense. In discussing whether the sanction
    involved an affirmative disability or restraint, the Reed court
    pursued a generalized analysis rather than one that focused specifically
    on the individual petitioner. The court’s use of the historical
    Mendoza-Martinez factors led to the conclusion that section 290 was
    a constitutionally suspect punitive measure. The court found that all
    of the other Mendoza-Martinez factors, considered separately and
    collectively, indicated that section 290 was a punishment within the
    constitutional meaning.
    Under the Lynch proportionality analysis, the Reed court found
    the nature of the section 647(a) offense/offender to be a minor danger.
    Under the intrajurisdictional comparison inquiry, other more
    serious crimes in California were found to be punished less severely.
    Under the interjurisdictional comparison, California’s statute was
    found to be the most severe of a group of similar statutes from other
    states. This analysis resulted in the Reed court holding that section
    290 registration for section 647(a) misdemeanants was cruel or unusual
    punishment because the punishment was found to be grossly
    disproportionate to the crime.
    As is illustrated in Reed, the Lynch test maintains a place in
    assuring the proportionality between crime and punishment, even after
    being tempered by the cases which followed it. Reed further suggests
    that the standard of review to be applied in California examinations
    of proportionality is the intensified rational basis model, an
    appropriate one for the aims of the proportionality analysis, but one
    which requires a clearer statement by the California courts.
    Denise M. DeRose
    ====

    The case review is the last case in the link. The CA courts went through the Medoza-Martinez factors and founded 290 to be punishment. Here’s a quote that might help push back on 290 as a whole:
    ====
    In examining the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, the Reed
    court found that the sex offender registration “may not have historically
    been regarded as punishment,” but that this fact was not dispositive.
    9 Relying on Trop v. Dulles,”0 the court denied that the
    government had the power to devise any punishment within its imagination,
    and asserted that “any technique outside the bounds of
    traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.”3 The Reed court
    asserted that the fact that a sanction does not fall within the historical
    definition of punishment indicates not only that the sanction is
    punishment, but that it is constitutionally suspect punishment.
    ====

    I want to re-emphasize “any technique outside the bounds of traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.”

    Registration is a technique outside the bounds of traditional penalties. This re: Reed case was reviewed in 1983 (the case initially was started in 1979, so the case was passed between the two dates). 290 was viewed as punishment by CA courts. Since 2003 Smith v Doe declared sex offender registration ‘not punishment’, then what is being applied to every CA 290 registrant today are ‘techniques outside the bounds of traditional penalties’ being imposed upon a free CA citizen. In other words, registrants are enrolled into compulsory service after completing their punishment custody by the State of Ca.

    People only think 290 is registration and re-registration. It isn’t. It’s more. You are under police surveillance every single minute you belong to the registry. You are subject to a police inquiry, round-up, or line-up because you belong to the registry, as stated by Kelly v Municipal (1958) and re: Reed (1983). But in today’s era, there are more regulations, restrictions, and regulations ‘outside the bounds of traditional penalties’ imposed upon today’s registrants.

    Remember, 2003 Smith v Doe re-wrote that the sex registry was not punishment. In re: Reed, before the 2003 Smith v Doe decision, it deemed the sex registry to be ‘constitutionally suspect punishment’.

    ** 13th Amendment, US Constitution:
    “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

    ** Section 6 of Article 1, CA Constitution:
    “Slavery is prohibited. Involuntary servitude is prohibited except to punish crime.”

    Involuntary servitude is compelled service, or compulsory service, compulsory duty.

    In jail, you do as you’re told. On parole/probation, you do as you’re told and are subject to any regulations, restrictions, and reporting. Those are punishments levied upon a convicted person. In both cases, a convict is under custody of the state. Once a convict is no longer under custody, then the state can no longer dictate what a person can do as they are now free from their punishment after serving their punishment. Unless you’re a registrant.

    If you read PC 290, then you’ll see it’s a “duty to register” phrased used often.

    As a registrant, you’re still in custody of the State of California as easily denoted by your Registration Identification Card by the State of California. As a free California citizen, you’re subjected to surveillance, regulations, restrictions, and in-person reporting, which includes taking a picture (mug shots) and fingerprinting (mug prints). It is a ‘duty’ for free California citizen who register to comply to the surveillance, regulation, restrictions, and in-person reporting with all 290 items. As a free California citizen who registers, any refusal to the subjected surveillance, regulations, restrictions, and in-person reporting is designated a criminal act.

    Comparatively, any other free California citizen are not subjected to imposed duties, such as 290 surveillance, regulations, restrictions, and in-person reporting nor are they criminalized for refusing the state of California for these “additional duties/services”.

    The registry was born out of conviction. Only punishment is a legal form of involuntary servitude as one loses their rights as they’re under custody of the state. Once out of custody from the state, an individual regains their rights as their service to the state of California has terminated. They no longer are compelled to serve the state as they’ve completed their punishment custody.

    The Sex Offender Registration Identification Card is evidence that a California citizen, though no longer under punishment custody, remains in custody of the State of California. That Registration Card states this California citizen “must” comply with surveillance, regulations, restrictions, and in-person reporting; any refusal will be deemed a criminal act and punished. This ‘duty’ must be complied with for the entirety of a person’s life. This ‘duty’ is not punishment. Megan’s law in California specifically states it is a ‘duty to register’.

    The state or nation can compel a convicted person to do duties required within the punishment levied. Any technique compelling a free citizen to a service or duty with the exception of punishment levied upon a convicted person is prohibited. Thus, making the registry scheme unconstitutional as per the 13th Amendment of the US Constitution and section 6 of Article 1 of the California Constitution as the registry has been deemed not punishment.

    ++++++++++++++++++++ Registration Tool Ineffective ++++++++++++++++++

    From the same Review paper:
    ====
    The majority examined the sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez
    factors together. The Reed court found that an alternate nonpunitive
    purpose for the statute existed, namely as a law enforcement
    tool. 8 Usually, if a rational connection can be found between a
    statute and a non-punitive purpose, the statute will not be held to be
    punitive. 9 Here, however, the justices balanced the non-punitive
    purpose against the harshness of the statute’s effect. The court reasoned
    that even though section 290 registration served a non-punitive
    purpose,4 the fact that the registration was an ineffective law enforcement
    tool invalidated this purpose in reference to the MendozaMartinez
    test. Thus, in light of the statute’s harsh effects, the court
    found that the registration statute was punitive under the last factor.
    ====

    See Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 922 n.7, 663 P.2d at 219 n.7, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661 n.7 for
    a discussion of the inefficiency of § 290 registration as a law enforcement tool.

    So if anyone wanted to see how Reed’s proved the tool was ineffective, I gave the info. But since the 2003 Smith v Doe decision stated the registry isn’t punitive, it’s going to be an uphill battle. So who’s correct? The CA Courts (as per re: Reed) or the Supreme Court (2003 Smith v Doe).

    +++++++++ update on my research about 1203.4 +++++++++

    In re: Reed (1983 or thereabouts), 1203.4 still removes you from the registry. Megan’s law was passed in 1994. PC 290.007 was passed in 2007. I’m still working my way up to 2007, but I haven’t stumbled upon any case that overturns the Kelly v Municipal decision until PC 290.007 says to “disregard” the 1203.4 immunity.

    If anyone spots a case overturning “kelly v municipal” between 1984 and 2007, then please do share the info. As of right now, I haven’t discovered any cases overturning “kelly v municipal”. That means “kelly v municipal” should still hold as law. (BTW, when Kelly v Municipal was passed, the registry was deemed non-punitive in 1958. In re: Reed 1983, the registry was then deemed punishment. So Kelly v Municipal should still be upheld even after the 2003 Smith v Doe decision…. or at least I hope so.)

    • AJ

      @New Person:
      From what I read of In re: Alva, 33 Cal.4th 254, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811, 92 P.3d 311 (2004), the CA SC overturned In re: Reed, so I don’t see how it’s at all useful.
      *****
      “Indeed, developments since Reed persuade us that Reed itself was incorrectly decided and must be overruled.”
      *****
      As for Kelly v Municipal, http://eva.rossintelligence.com/ (thank you mike r!) indicates “no significant negative treatment” of the case, nor has it been overturned. They do indicate 30 positive treatments.

      I highly recommend the above site. It’s free, and they encourage anyone to join it. Don’t fret when it asks you about your field or specialty or whatever. I had that concern, but the operator of the site told me not to worry about it and outright asked me to sign up! I’ve found it of great use since, and in fact it found a case I could find nowhere else.

      P.S. mike r: even your case can be found on there. You’re semi-famous, dude!

      • New Person

        Thanks, AJ!

        Although it says no negative treatments, NPS discovered a 2014 law that rendered it voided. =/

        Logic is b/c two cases found the registry statutory, therefore registration and re-registration cannot be criminal nor quasi-criminal. (I don’t know how as you can be imprisoned or penalized if you don’t re-register.)

        Yet the SCOTUS denoted that in-person reporting is a disability and Snyder also denoted that in-person reporting is a disability. Heck, Kelly v Municipal says it’s a penalty and disability. (All the quotations used below belong to the Kelly v Municipal court case.)

        There’s something else about Kelly v Municipal. It’s a two part approach.
        1. Registration and re-registration designates criminal or quasi-criminal in character.
        “Section 290 added a life sentence of compulsory police registration [160 Cal. App. 2d 45] and reregistration. That, clearly, is the imposition of a criminal penalty in the strictest and narrowest sense of that term.”

        2. Conviction status.
        “Here we are considering the use of the word “conviction” as it appears in two statutes. Section 290 uses it in both senses: After judgment, in respect to the convict who has served his sentence or who is released upon parole; during the suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (see Pen. Code, § 1203.1), in relation to the probationer. Section 1203.4, because it deals with the probationer, has reference to his status as a convicted person during the period of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.”

        The Courts in Kelly v Municipal stated this:
        “In short, the fair intendment of these two statutes when read together is that conviction denotes a need for registration and police surveillance when the convicted person is allowed to return to society, whether after serving a sentence or upon the granting of parole or when released upon probation prior to the imposition or the execution of a sentence of imprisonment. But in the case of the probationer who demonstrates his ability to go straight, upon his own, by faithfully fulfilling all of the terms and conditions of his probation, the need for further surveillance and registration terminates upon his release pursuant to the sanction of section 1203.4. ”

        Kelly v Municipal is a two-pronged analysis and judgement. PC 290 and 1203.4 while under probation go hand in hand with conviction. The conflict lies when the recipient of the 1203.4 has successfully completed probation and thus no longer classified as a convict.

        (omgoodness… i’m getting amped up again)

        This is important because 1203.4 has three components of immunities:
        1. Case is set aside
        2. Accusation or Information is dimissed
        3. All penalties and disabilities are released thereafter

        #3 immunity deals with registration and re-registration as criminal or quasi-criminal.

        But #1 and #2 immunities are what Kelly v Municipal court also made a judgement upon. “A person convicted of any of the offenses mentioned in section 290 is by the provisions of that section required to register with the appropriate law enforcement agency.” This is true for all convicted of any offenses mentioned in section 290. But 1203.4 states you are no longer convicted and only a person convicted of any of the offenses in section 290 is required to register.

        Kelly v Municipal made sure the immunities set forth within 1203.4 does not conflict with 290 as well as re-emphasize what 1203.4 holds, even for PC 290 registrants. Otherwise, there is a conflict of the two statutes. A registrant with a 1203.4 means a conviction exists to levied a PC 290 registration and that your conviction involved one of the offenses for PC 290.

        Again, this conflict was resolved in Kelly v Municipal with the courts stating that a person must register under section 290 only while they are convicted. 1203.4 says you’re not longer convicted if you successfully complete probation.

        Although newer laws have surfaced in 290.5, making the Certificate of Rehabilitation a possible avenue off the registry, that law seems in direct conflict with Kelly v Municipal decision upon who needs constant police surveillance. Kelly v Municipal decision stated the moment you are no longer convicted, then you no longer belong to PC 290. This is a protected immunity and a binding contract. PC 290.5, PC 290.007, and the newly created CoR release from the registry at a minimum of 10 years all violate at least three CA Constitutional laws:

        1. Section 1 of Article 1: Inalienable right to pursue and obtain privacy.
        1203.4 is a legal pursuit to obtain privacy as the conviction is set aside and all accusation or information are dismissed. The current CoR negates the legal path, moving the goal post several years beyond as well as increases the burden to obtain privacy (being re-judged on your rehabilitation when the 1203.4 program is a rehabilitation program in itself.)

        2. Section 7b of Article 1: A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or revoked.
        Kelly v Municipal courts stated PC 290 cannot supersede 1203.4. The immunities set forth in 1203.4 is for all who qualify and earn them, which includes no longer being a convict as well as not having information or accusation existing. Only one convicted of a sex offense in PC 290 are required to register.

        3. Section 9 of Article 1: A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.
        1203.4 is a binding contract. Kelly v Municipal passed judgement in 1958 that only while a person is convicted, then that person must register. When one is no longer convicted, then one stops registering. PC 290.5 and PC 290.007 violate that contract by pushing back the date to be relieved of registering as well as increase the burden of proof to be relieved of registering.

        ———————————————

        4. Section 6, Article 1: Slavery is prohibited. Involuntary servitude is prohibited except to punish crime.
        Kelly v Municipal stated registration and re-registration were compulsory work which was criminal or quasi-criminal in character. The duty to register and re-register is compelled service to the state/local police department.

        In 2014, People v Hamdon re-iterated that the registry isn’t punishment, thus negating registration and re-registration as criminal or quasi-criminal. But the registry was levied due to a conviction. The only compulsory service that is legal is if it is a punishment for a crime. Since People v Hamdon were quite adamant that registration and re-registration are not punishment, then the compulsory service upon a free person that is not punishment for a crime is prohibited. That compulsory service carries the penalty of law for non-compliance to the compulsory service. A free CA citizen who is not convicted is domineered into coercive service under penalty of law that is not punishment.

        Thus the registry scheme that is not punishment for a conviction violates Section 6, Article 1 of the CA constitution as compulsory registration and re-registration that includes a mug shot and fingerprinting are required as well as subjected to a police lineup. “The duty to reregister upon changing one’s place of address is a continuing duty.”

        =============
        AJ,
        thanks for jogging my head! I had to read and re-read Kelly v Municipal. That case is profound is so many ways. They noted in court that registering is compulsory duty! An AG cannot deny what the courts have entered onto the books! But I didn’t realize the second prong to that decision. They even went out of their way to make sure 1203.4 immunities wouldn’t be diminished for registrants who qualified for 1203.4!

        And yes, I even threw my “involuntary servitude” aspect in there!

        thank you so very much! I’ll sleep less depressed tonight! ha ha ha

        oh I hope NPS can bounce off more ideas for me or think I might be onto something!

        • AO (AlexO)

          @New Person, So what does that all mean in regards to still needing to register after being granted 1203.4?

  45. Double registered?

    If you are registered in your home state and FLA, the FLA Action Committee is looking for out of state people who registered in FLA and then went back home or moved out of state to join their lawsuit against FLA. (https://narsol.org/category/advocacy/)

  46. mike r

    Man anyone that files in CA state court with any type of cognizable arguments will win hands down. Just as Alaska’s was won hands down despite Smith. I would have filed in state court but that would limit the scope of the decision to only those in CA whereas my suit will set precedent for many future suits in and out of CA.
    New Person you are getting pretty good at this keep it up and you will be ready for your 1203.4 suit……

  47. mike r

    Thought I would throw this on general.
    https://ufile.io/vbuxv
    Discovery for status conference on May 16…

  48. NPS

    If it’s good case law (especially one that establishes precendent), it doesn’t really matter how old it is.

    My apologies for not getting back to you sooner. I’ve been really busy as of late, especially since my professor hired me to be his legal assistant. (I now have 2 jobs). I have access to Westlaw. I’ll do some research over the weekend and get back to you on Monday.

  49. mike r

    You are absolutely right NPS. I am sure any help New Person can get with research would be great, I would love to help more but man I am swamped with my case and school and life but I will try and throw my two cents in whenever I can.
    New Person here is the Sac pleading paper all you have to do is use this and put your info in. Piece of cake…
    https://ufile.io/h995h
    I would stick with state court if I were you since the state constitution offers more protection and a decision from the state supreme court can be reversed by the feds but it will still not affect the state decision..Just as the Alaska case where they person filed in fed court which was reversed by Smith as we all know and they had to turn around and file in state court anyways where they did get relief. I kind of wished I would have started in the state but my issues are different than what you are going to bring and I want to get relief for as many as possible which is what will happen if I win in fed court and I can always go back and file with a hands down easy win in state court which will give me relief anyways but only from CA registration.

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