A Tennessee Federal District Court last week denied the State’s Motion to Dismiss and ordered an injunction preventing them from enforcing the sex offender registry against an individual whose offense pre-dated the enactment of the ordinance.
The best part of this case was that the court based its opinion on Ex Post Facto grounds!
Link to PDF of the decision [eagle.com]
All this guy did since getting out of prison was try and succeed at bettering himself. And all the state did was slap him down every step of the way.
I’m glad he won, and I hope that this man and his family can finally have a real life.
This is a nice win and reiterates that today’s registry goes far and beyond Smith V Doe (or Alaska’s registry at that time).
Here’s a quote about Smith v Doe: “Based on those factors, the Supreme Court concluded that the Alaska registration system was not punitive in character. Among the grounds for its conclusion was that the Alaska law “impose[d] no physical restraint.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. ”
No physical restraint. That’s called in-person re-registration.
Another quote from the article, referencing Smith V Doe: “The court also found that the second factor—affirmative disability and restraint—favored a finding of punitive effect, in light of the aforementioned restrictions on a registered offender’s residence, work, and movement. The court observed that those restrictions amounted to “restraints . . . greater than those imposed by the Alaska statute [at issue in Smith] by an order of magnitude.” Id. With regard to factor three—the traditional aims of punishment—the court concluded that the Michigan act”
A quote from California’s Kelly v Municipal, 1958: “[1] The duty to reregister upon changing one’s place of address is a continuing duty, a burden which the convicted person carries with him until his dying day. Being thus severely limited in his freedom of movement and continuously under police surveillance, all stemming from the conviction which has been set aside, the conclusion seems irresistible that this registration requirement is one of the “penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted,” from which, as a faithful and successful probationer, he is thereafter “released” by the mandate of section 1203.4. fn. *”
Kelly already identified that freedom of movement was restriction with in-person re-registration in 1958. Thus predating what Snyder and this Tenn case is identifying from Smith v Doe, “no physical restraint” via the registry was acceptable in 2003. How is requiring in-person re-registration not a physical restraint? Again, Smith v Doe cited “imposed no physical restraint”.
The loss of a right is punishment. In Ca, the right to privacy was enacted in 1972. Thus, losing privacy is punishment.
We have Michigan’s Snyder and this Tenn case using Smith v Doe as the reference of what is beyond the original law. In Ca, we should be able to do the same and include “right to privacy” as a disability lost to the registry. That should help all those who earned 1203.4 because it specifically states, ” ‘the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusation or information against such defendant.’ ” Yet, the government can still used said information as current, live information.
I’m trying here, but this registry is simply wearing me down.
A PA (state) loss recently and now a TN (Fed District) win…a heavyweight bout going back and forth with too bloodied bodies still standing…