AZ: HB 2870 makes it harder for registrants to find housing by prohibiting multiple registrants at same location

Written by Quiet Too Long — 02/06/2026 Argument for Consideration — “Use at Will” If a civil framework can create a permanent status group subject to criminal liability while disabling the constitutional protections that ordinarily govern such systems, then the Constitution lacks a mechanism to prevent the emergence of a civilly constructed caste — an outcome no court can treat as a matter of legislative policy alone. The civil label not only insulates the framework from constitutional scrutiny, but also enables the enactment of additional restrictions — including forms of compelled self‑confinement — that would ordinarily be unconstitutional. As the scheme expands, it imposes continuing obligations, fees, and compliance requirements that function as a form of civic servitude: duties that arise solely from the maintenance of a civil status that cannot be contested, adjudicated, or meaningfully reviewed. When the force of such laws circumvents the constitutional practices designed to safeguard the public, it places We the People — the constitutional source of all governmental authority — in a position where unconstitutional implications must be anticipated, endured, and navigated without access to meaningful review. The civil designation not only shields the existing framework from constitutional scrutiny, but also facilitates the enactment of additional restrictions and compliance‑based burdens that would be impermissible in a criminal context. This dynamic is reflected in the historical expansion of the registry scheme, where categorical restrictions, compelled search conditions, jurisdictional vagueness, and financial or compliance‑based obligations create impartiality disabilities that prevent neutral adjudication and render meaningful defense structurally impossible. The scheme also creates a structural conflict with the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal liability attaches to a civil status that cannot be contested, adjudicated, or meaningfully reviewed. The individual is therefore exposed to criminal punishment without any mechanism through which the State must prove — or the individual can disprove — the factual predicates that give rise to that liability. This produces a constitutional paradox: the State may impose criminal penalties while the individual is categorically disabled from invoking the very standard of proof that defines criminal justice. Such a framework does not merely strain existing doctrine; it renders the reasonable‑doubt standard inoperative, creating an impartiality disability that no court has yet addressed. This paradox is compounded by the absence of a victim. Criminal liability is triggered not by conduct that harms a person or the public, but by the maintenance of a civil status that cannot be contested or meaningfully reviewed. Without a victim, injury, or wrongful act, the evidentiary foundation upon which the reasonable‑doubt standard operates disappears, leaving the individual exposed to criminal sanction while constitutionally essential safeguards remain inaccessible. The framework operates against a backdrop of public distrust shaped by decades of warnings, predictions, and generalized assertions of danger. When the public is conditioned to view the status group as inherently risky, the civil label functions not as a neutral classification but as a conduit through which fear‑based assumptions are treated as fact. This informational imbalance reinforces the insulation of the scheme from constitutional review: the more the public is forewarned, the more unavoidable the perceived danger becomes, and the more difficult it is for courts to evaluate the framework without the weight of that narrative. This dynamic does not reflect misconduct; it reflects a structural environment in which misinformation, fear, and categorical assumptions make impartial adjudication practically impossible. This appeal does not allege misconduct or seek liability. It asks the appellate court to clarify whether existing doctrine contains a constitutional safeguard against a civil framework that imposes criminal exposure, compelled self‑confinement, and servitude‑like compliance obligations while remaining insulated from constitutional review — and if not, whether a new doctrinal or pictorial framework is required to ensure clarity, neutrality, and constitutional consistency. The purpose of this appeal is not to assign blame or disrupt established doctrine, but to honor the constitutional values entrusted to us by the Framers. By presenting the structural tension created when a civil framework imposes criminal exposure while remaining shielded from constitutional review, this appeal offers the Court a principled avenue to reconsider the doctrine without attributing fault to any branch of government. This approach preserves institutional integrity, respects the separation of powers, and provides a constitutional ‘escape hatch’ through which the government may realign the framework with foundational principles without harm, liability, or disruption.” Disclaimer: This statement is offered solely as a structural constitutional argument for appellate consideration. It does not assert wrongdoing, challenge legislative motives, or provide legal advice. Any use of this text should be evaluated within the appropriate legal, procedural, and jurisdictional context.