A great decision out of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana was issued earlier this week.
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Federal Court Judge Richard L, Young found this result illogical. In his 37 page opinion he writes, “The state has offered no evidence that out-of-state sex offenders or those that leave and return are inherently more dangerous than resident sex offenders, and the court can think of none.”
But what is really great about this decision is that it is ANOTHER federal district court that has found the registry is PUNISHMENT!
Awesome! I was just wondering about this case. I hadn’t checked on it in a while but was going to do so–thanks to FAC for saving me some money on PACER. 🙂 (I have checked on Millard, though. Still nothing remarkable to report.)
This Judgment is fantastic. It has all sorts of goodies to use or re-use in other cases. I particularly like that the Judge cited the *real* recidivism rates and said RCs are no different than “regular offenders,” and that he, like all the other winning decisions, cites the lack of individualized assessment. I got a kick out of the fact that the State’s own testimony was used against it (just like in the AL cases)…seems the bureaucrats cannot keep the lie going anymore.
I feel this case has great potential to land at SCOTUS someday because this time it will have to go through the 7th (assuming IN appeals), and the 7th seemingly hasn’t seen a RC law it doesn’t like. So unlike in Snyder and Muniz, a ruling from the 7th appealed to SCOTUS may well be contrary to Snyder and Muniz. That’s all a long way off, though.
Once again, another chunk falls out of the wall of lies that is SOR(N)A.
Someone please send this to the Tenth CCoA
Wow! The opinion is an excellent read, a “must read”, if you will. The judge’s analysis is spot on, and the opinion is clear and concise. He used the factors in Smith v Doe to utterly demolish the Indiana SORA with respect to ex post facto punishment. I like how he referred repeatedly to Saenz v Roe in his right to travel analysis. On all points, he reached the same conclusions that we all here have recognized for years.
This short opinion reveals how excessive Indiana’s registration scheme is, far worse than many states in my opinion. Yet the schemes adopted by all states share at least a few factors in common. This should help challengers in other states craft more effective complaints.
I expect the state will appeal and the 7th will reverse. And that will be a good thing, as AJ opines above.
Quotable, from the opinion in the part analyzing SORA’s Rational Connection to a Non-punitive Purpose and Excessiveness: “the state cannot use a sledgehammer to swat a bee.”
Let’s not forget that this only applies as ex post facto to those convicted prior to SORNA.
What I would like some judge to explain is how the same regimes are “regulatory” to those convicted afterward. Same restrictions, same requirements, and all the stigma that goes with it. The judge even cited how recidivism rates are among the lowest and that nearly all registrant convictions are for status (parole, probation, or registry) offenses as opposed to new crime of any kind.
Stevens was spot on in his dissent in Smith – “No matter how often the Court may repeat and manipulate multifactor tests . . . it will never persuade me that the registration and reporting obligations that are imposed on convicted sex offenders and on no one else as a result of their convictions are not part of their punishment.” (Also quoted in this opinion)
A legislature shouldn’t be allowed to bypass its constitutional restrictions (state or federal) with additional registry laws merely by claiming intent to be a civil, regulatory one. If it’s punitive for one, then it’s punitive for all. It shouldn’t continue once sentences are served, regardless of conviction date.
Step by step, bit by bit, piece by piece, ruling by ruling a glimmer of sanity and hope is happening across the country. Every victory small and large goes into building the case against the abuse, oppression, excessive punishment, stereotyping, and blanket discrimination and unconstitutionality against people on the registry.
I’m still trying to understand what this means. I was convinced in December 2000. When I moved to Indiana they labeled me a tier III. I no longer live in indiana, but if I moved back, would I be able to get things like “svp” removed? When I lived there, the cops who did home visits and the ones at the office told me I’d be a good candidate to petition to get off since I had been out offence free for over 10 years. I figure if I could get the “svp” taken off, I’d stand a better chance with petitioning to fully get off. Am I correct in writing all of this?
But what about the Federal SORNA? Would someone who moves to Indiana and is not required to register thanks to this decision still have to register because of the Adam Walsh Act?
The thing about Indiana is one CAN petition to get off the registry after having been out of prison for 10 years (all tiers can do this), but its set up to potentially cost you 10K just to be told, no, try again next year. (5k for lawyer and another 5k for a psychologist to make a report for you). Pretty much its designed to be extremely hard to get off, since the average person does NOT have 10k to spend of a “maybe”. If one has been out over 10 years offense free, then just take them off!!!!
Has the State of Indiana appealed this case?